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Steven Pressman’s book is the most balanced, sympathetic and constructive 
critique of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century I have yet read. This is 
quite an achievement since I have read many and it is now a crowded field (see 
Fullbrook and Morgan 2014; Morgan 2015; Birdsall 2014; Sheil 2014). At the 
same time, it would be to do the book a disservice to describe it as merely an 
introduction to Piketty’s Capital—which one might infer from ‘understanding’. It 
is in many ways, and as a critical text, a significant improvement on the original. 
Pressman does more than provide an accessible account of the key aspects of 
Capital. Rather, Pressman takes the key aspects as a point of departure in order 
to provide fuller contextualised explanation of the trends and issues arising as 
well as the accounts of theory that Piketty could himself have usefully 
incorporated in Capital.  
One of the major general comments made by many regarding Capital is 
that it is very long, data dense and yet simultaneously limited in its ‘explanations’ 
of the data from the point of view of contextualising theory; instead ‘explanation’ 
is mainly limited to a highly generalised thesis regarding the mechanics of the 
relations between a set of variables and a stated set of ‘laws’, which express 
those relations (where many both within and outside the mainstream then 
dispute the construction or mechanics and their consequences; see e.g. Mankiw 
2015, Palley 2014, Sawyer 2015).  Pressman recognizes that in contrast to much 
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of mainstream economics focusing on inequality as a core issue and on 
innovative collection of historical data has great merit. It avoids the whole being 
overburdened by an extensive focus on and transmission of unrealistic formal 
theory. It leads Piketty also to approach economics purposefully. His intent is for 
his approach to be historically grounded—in the sense of being data-led rather 
than distorted by a priori postulates—but also real-world relevant in terms of 
identifying possible solutions to the generalised problems identified in the 
trends expressed in his laws (hence his global wealth tax as a response to rising 
wealth inequality expressed conditionally in r > g). For Pressman this approach 
is highly useful.  
At the same time Pressman also recognizes the basic problems that 
Piketty’s approach in Capital creates. He treats each problem sympathetically, 
provides reasonable justifications and interpretations of the limits of Piketty’s 
approach, and then also provides further material, which extend one’s 
understanding of the general focus. Moreover, he does this in 196 pages 
including the index, compared to the 685 pages including index of Capital. So, 
when I suggest Pressman’s book is an improvement it is in two ways. First, it is a 
paragon of concise exposition. As such, it is liable to be read, unlike Capital, 
which unfortunately (and pun intended) is proving liable only to be owned. 
Second, and one ironically can only get a sense of this by reading Pressman’s 
book after or in conjunction with Capital, it is shorter with no great loss of 
significant substance. Quite the reverse, it actually provides greater clarity, 
context and theoretical depth. Inter alia, it made me rethink some of my previous 
opinions regarding the defects (reconstructed as potentials) of Capital. However, 
in the end, despite the positive and fair-minded tone of Pressman’s book he 
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cannot help but present a case that does accumulate to a damaging critique of 
Piketty’s actual approach (if not his intent). In the end, Pressman damns Capital 
with great rather than faint praise. One can illustrate this by describing the 
overall construction of Pressman’s book and drawing attention to some of the 
key points made. 
The substantive argument of Piketty’s Capital scarcely appears in the first 
three chapters of Understanding Capital. Instead, Pressman focuses on matters of 
context. In chapter one he sets out the basis of the Cambridge Capital 
Controversy in order to establish that the marginal productivity theory is 
untenable as an explanation of the returns to capital. That theory takes the 
economy’s endowment of capital as a datum in order to determine the profit 
rate. But when the capital stock is comprised of many different kinds of capital 
goods, it must be specified as a value magnitude, and this in turn will depend on 
the rate of profit—which the endowment of capital is supposed to enable us to 
explain. This circularity problem renders the neoclassical theory of distribution 
contestable. Hence the issue of returns becomes an open matter, perhaps 
determined by institutional factors and power relations. Concomitantly, 
historical factors must now enter into the explanation of distribution, since it 
cannot be merely an expression of technical relations identified in formal theory. 
This leads logically to an exploration of actual inequality. Pressman makes it 
clear one must move beyond a simple focus on abstract economic theory in order 
to explore the problem of distribution.   
According to Pressman, Piketty, having encountered overly technical and 
abstract approaches to economic problems at MIT, turned then to this historical 
focus, becoming in Pressman’s terms ‘a true political economist’ (p. 7). Moreover, 
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his collaborative work on income and wealth was liable to become prominent 
since it accorded with emerging contemporary concerns. Chapter two describes 
how inequality of wealth and income can be measured. He sets out the standard 
measure of inequality (the Gini coefficient) and then highlights that all methods 
of and sources for data collection for income and wealth are problematic—
notably tax and survey data. Piketty opts for tax data and is perhaps ‘too 
enthusiastic’ about their reliability.  
Whilst mainstream accounts of inequality focus on how globalization and 
technical change allegedly give rise to unavoidable distributional effects, Piketty 
contends that it is the historically observed interaction between wealth 
inequality and income inequality that leads to greater inequality through time. 
Asymmetries of wealth result in greater capture of current income by those who 
own more, which in turn exacerbates problems of wealth concentration over 
time.  
In chapter three, Pressman adds further context by examining the various 
arguments for why significant and growing inequality should be considered 
economically and socially undesirable. Drawing on Keynesian and Post-
Keynesian ideas, Pressman notes that greater inequality slows growth, slows 
productivity growth, and creates resources for the capture of political power and 
influence by the few, which reproduces the basis of inequality through policy. In 
terms of corollary socio-political effects, democracy is distorted (creating in turn 
a sense of disenfranchisement), whilst health, well-being and social mobility are 
all adversely affected. Piketty fails to provide this context as a point of departure 
for his argument, thereby obscuring one of the main reasons the argument is so 
important.   
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Thereafter, Pressman begins to examine the actual substance of Capital. 
In chapter four he notes Piketty’s brief engagement with Marx and Ricardo but 
failure to engage with Keynes. He then introduces the Piketty inequality r > g; 
notably he does not refer to it or the related equations as laws, though Piketty 
does so). In one simple example Pressman demonstrates the long-run numerical 
effects of r > g with far greater concision and lucidity than Piketty achieves. 
Suppose that a person starts out with $100,000 in inherited wealth and 
$100,000 in yearly labour income. If she receives a 5% return on her wealth, and 
her wages increase at a rate of 1% per year, then after 100 years her labour 
income would be $268,000 but her wealth assets would accumulate to $12.5 
million and annual income from wealth would be $600,000—far greater than her 
labour income. Even with taxation and consumption out of wealth, the 
underlying tendency is one where stocks of wealth accumulate and affects 
income flows. Hence, significant initial inequalities of wealth and a return in 
excess of growth imply wealth concentration and income inequality over time—
if institutions and taxation do not prevent this. Chapter four also highlights the 
confusion caused by Piketty’s idiosyncratic use of the word ‘capital’ as 
synonymous with wealth. Pressman then sets out Piketty’s discussion of the 
historical limits to growth based on actual productivity, technology, participation 
rates etc and the convergence effects between countries, noting that whilst the 
evidence of low growth rates cannot be ignored, Piketty doesn’t offer any 
explanation of the actual variations. Moreover, Pressman notes that Piketty’s 
focus on convergence early in the book is largely tangential to what comes later 
and may account for why so few readers get past the first thirty pages.     
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In chapter five Pressman sets out Piketty’s capital/income ratio 
calculation; over time capital (meaning in Piketty’s terms wealth) will tend to 
some level measured as a percentage or ratio (e.g. 600% or 6) of annual income, 
based on the relative levels of saving to growth. Here, Pressman usefully 
contrasts Marx and Piketty. For Marx instability arising from wealth 
concentration and from growing pressure to exploit labour to maintain returns 
to capital was inherent to capitalism; for Piketty it is a problem of finance 
inherent in compounding, and is in this sense not rooted specifically in 
capitalism alone (though Piketty himself often describes the tendency as part of 
the logic of capitalism).  
Pressman also provides a critique of Piketty’s assumption that savings 
and growth are independent of one another. A Keynesian would argue greater 
saving, if not counterbalanced by productive investment, slows growth over 
time, whilst a mainstream economist would argue higher savings necessarily 
entails increased investment and consequently higher productivity and faster 
growth. In any case, as growth occurs, if income increases then savings rates 
should also rise as marginal consumption rates fall. Piketty does not address any 
of these issues, but instead applies a rather ‘orthodox’ (p. 93) assumption that 
the rate of return to capital (wealth) depends on technology. (Here Piketty 
introduces a theoretical point of reference despite his avowed intention to 
eschew formal theorising in favour of a data-driven historical approach.) This 
leaves open an important question regarding how wealth will be able to 
maintain a constant return in excess of growth. Piketty often emphasises power 
and institutions, but in the underlying theory he ‘is claiming that the return to 
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capital is the marginal productivity of capital. A constant r thus requires that 
there be no diminishing returns to the use of capital’, so the use of capital must in 
the end justify the return through its productive use (ibid.). 
Pressman also notes here that Piketty introduces the Cambridge Capital 
Controversy, but basically gets this wrong. Not only does Piketty neglect to note 
that Samuelson conceded defeat, he fails also to understand that the point 
concerned theoretical consistency regarding the measurement of capital, an 
issue that is essentially irrelevant to Piketty’s empirical investigations (even if it 
is not entirely irrelevant for the theoretical architecture that underpins the 
orthodox approach he ultimately adopts).                  
 In chapter six, Pressman sets out the key data on growing income 
inequality and how this relates to wealth inequality. He explores the u-shaped 
pattern that Piketty finds in the capital/income ratio—the fall in inequality in the 
mid-20th century and the rise thereafter (which Piketty accounts for by referring 
to the two world wars and post-1945 institutional shifts). Many critiques of 
Piketty argue that since sectoral effects are significant for differences in labour 
income, then targeted minimum wages and more collective bargaining will 
equalise income distributions. Pressman observes that these critiques typically 
fail to note that Piketty is generally supportive of such approaches, but considers 
them less important than addressing wealth concentration, since it is the 
compounding effect of unequal wealth that is of greater significance for the long-
run dynamics of income inequality. 
Pressman also explores Piketty’s account of how income is commanded in 
modern economies (for example CEOs as superstar managers, highlighting the 
power component of income differences). He emphasises Piketty’s argument 
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that tendencies seem to indicate a long-term slowdown in growth, but not in 
returns to wealth, making his call for policy intervention to slow the rise of 
wealth inequality more urgent (p. 125). 
In chapter seven, Pressman puts forward a constructive critique of 
Piketty’s global wealth tax. He states that a wealth tax is an important proposal 
because if wealth concentration does not decline, the logic of compounding 
means that inequality of both income and wealth with rise further. An income tax 
has no direct bearing on this because it leaves accumulated wealth intact as a 
source of income. However, a globally coordinated 1% tax on net assets between 
€1 and €5 million and a 2% tax on assets greater than €5 million would narrow 
the degree to which r exceeds g. Standard problems with such a tax (not 
adequately addressed by Piketty) include the compliance costs of reporting for 
all citizens rather than just the wealthy; the problem of achieving, designing, 
implementing and overseeing the actual tax regulation; and the distortive 
incentive to shift assets from forms held in financial institutions (which will 
necessarily be reported to the tax authorities), reducing deposits and affecting 
banking structures, and which will of course lead to new avoidance and evasion 
strategies by corporations and the wealthy.  Moreover, Piketty’s primary 
argument is that the wealth tax, though seemingly utopian already exists in 
various countries (though he fails to note that it has been dramatically reduced 
or abandoned in many of those places); he views it as the only viable solution. As 
Pressman notes, it may be more effective to introduce or augment domestic 
inheritance and estate taxes (as well as a more effective corporation tax and 
progressive income tax as complements), and so the argument for ‘only’ seems 
overstated. 
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Finally, in chapter eight Pressman addresses the substantive critiques of 
Capital that had been made up to the time his book went to press. He notes the 
general tone of critique was positive, though several critics seemed to have read 
little or nothing of the actual text. He identifies Milanovic (2014) and then Palley 
(2014) as the best of the available critiques, before addressing Chris Giles’s now 
well-known attack on Piketty’s book in the Financial Times. Giles (2014) argues 
that Piketty does not explain his data and makes several adjustment errors (such 
as neglecting to take weighted averages when compiling averages across several 
countries). In addition, Giles claims that Piketty’s wealth data are unreliable for 
the UK.  As Pressman clearly demonstrates, the mistakes in the data are minor 
and create no significant distortion. Moreover, even if one makes weighted 
adjustments where appropriate the actual trends identified by Piketty remain 
more or less intact. Furthermore, Giles’s claim that Piketty’s data are unreliable 
essentially amounts to a preference for survey data rather than tax data. Here, 
the only significant difference Giles establishes is falling wealth inequality in the 
UK in recent decades; but this applies only to the top 10% not the top 1%, and 
the difference in actual figures is within an expected range of error. So Piketty’s 
work is relatively untouched by this critique. This leads Pressman into his 
conclusion concerning the long-term significance of Capital.  
Pressman makes clear that Piketty’s historical-empirical approach places 
a significant question mark against standard accounts of the economic effects of 
globalization. According to those accounts, technological change and increases in 
the global supply of labour reduce wages for the unskilled. Piketty shows this 
simple technical explanation is incorrect, since it can explain neither the 
compounding effect of wealth concentrations nor why inequality diverges among 
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otherwise similar nations. But, as Pressman notes, Piketty’s analysis has 
problems of its own: it uses the term capital in an idiosyncratic and confusing 
way, and does not emphasise sufficiently that the core problem is the 
compounding of returns, a problem which could apply to any system where 
there are differentials of wealth. As a final positive note, Pressman speculates 
that Piketty’s book will pave the way for further work on a problem that is likely 
to be with us for a long time.   
 
Pressman has achieved a great deal in Understanding Piketty’s Capital, which 
might be more aptly titled a Concise Alternative to Piketty’s Capital. However, he 
is perhaps too sympathetic in his approach to Piketty. By this I mean that the 
collective implications of the limitations and problems of Capital are more 
damning than Pressman suggests. In view of the long list of criticisms he puts 
forward, Pressman could have been more emphatic about the weaknesses of 
Piketty’s book. Pressman’s concise treatment obscures what is most problematic 
about Capital—its lack of clarity, its excessive length and its intrinsic 
inconsistencies. These are more serious defects than Pressman indicates. We 
differ here to some degree because of the way Pressman uses the term 
explanation.  
For example, Pressman states that Capital ‘explains why inequality 
declined for a good part of the twentieth century as well as why inequality began 
rising in the late twentieth century’ (p. 169). I would suggest that it doesn’t really 
do so. Piketty makes the highly generalised claim that institutions and war can 
significantly influence the concentration of wealth and the flow of income to 
stocks of wealth. Then he puts forward three ‘laws’, which express a set of highly 
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generalised relations, and meticulously explores the data with reference to these 
laws. However, neither the reference to history nor the laws are fully developed 
or justified in an explanatory sense. This is something that Pressman ultimately 
acknowledges; but in attempting to be even-handed he falls into a contradiction 
through semantic slippage. For a Post-Keynesian and for almost any non-
mainstream economist, an economy is a complex historical and evolving entity 
with shifting sets of socio-economic relations. Causation is complex, shifting, 
contingent, and cumulatively involves transformative parts and potentials 
(Lawson 2003). The whole is rooted in conventions and institutions which 
evolved to provide order and stability in the face of fundamental uncertainty. 
Explanation is a historical account of causes. This requires a deep investigation 
of processes. Piketty does not quite provide this. He does not get much beyond 
stating that history matters, and then focuses on the patterns of movement of 
aggregated data. Whatever its merits, this approach is not really explanation in 
any substantive sense, for it doesn’t describe the actual institutions, events and 
variations that are determinative (though never deterministic).  
Pressman begins his book by creating a theoretical frame of reference, 
implicitly accepting that what is problematic is not an overreliance on theory, 
but the adoption of an unsound theory. A well-conceived, consistent, coherent 
and empirically relevant theory is integral to building the case for a historical 
and process-based account of any economic issue. As Pressman frequently points 
out, Piketty’s critique of theory tends to miss the point: he makes limited use of 
theory, and the theory he uses tends to be orthodox, which is to say problematic. 
Pressman implies but does not say outright that there are basic tensions 
between Piketty’s use of theory and his references to issues like power and 
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institutions (juxtaposition is not integration). Pressman also draws attention to 
Piketty’s lack of focus on causes and particularities, in effect acknowledging that 
Piketty is not providing ‘explanation’ in the sense described above.  
Given that Pressman is a prominent non-mainstream economist whose 
own work embodies an open-systems approach to explanation and causation, 
one can only infer that he is being diplomatic. Though in the main this does not 
matter—if anything it indicates that Pressman is a fair-minded critic committed 
to constructive pluralism, which is surely a positive attribute—in some ways it 
does. Pressman’s diplomacy makes it more difficult to see that there are different 
ways to position Capital and the problems it explores—precisely because there 
are many aspects to causal processes, few of which are actually examined in 
Capital. For example, Mongiovi (2015) notes that Piketty never adequately 
explains why he assigns central importance to the capital/income ratio rather 
than the wage share (Mongiovi 2015). Since Piketty is interested in inequality 
paying some attention to the wage share would seem to be a potentially fruitful 
approach for a variety of reasons. The meaning of wage share is less ambiguous 
and data for wage levels are widely available. Most importantly, the core tension 
within modern capitalism that gives sense to inequality is ideational: the claim 
that market forces lead to rising productivity imply net rises in economic welfare 
and the potential for greater income per capita, whilst the same market forces 
require cost reductions as part of the competitive effort to raise profits (implying 
in terms of various logics that wage rises and public welfare programmes etc are 
not affordable). These are historical, institutional and power issues that raise 
fundamental questions regarding the form and tenability of capitalism over time 
(see Sawyer 2015).  
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Addressing these kinds of issues would have required Piketty to write a 
very different kind of book. But that is precisely the point. Different points of 
departure are possible and may offer very different types of emphasis (e.g. 
Perrons 2014). This extends to the way Piketty considers the future. Though 
Piketty is careful to say his forecasts hold only if there is no change to the 
contexts which give rise to the current tendency for inequality to increase, he 
nonetheless provides those forecasts over 100 years and more. One key claim is 
that there is no reason to think that growth will be higher in the future. There is 
a fundamental issue here which involves a basic conflation. Productivity is not 
growth; productivity is one way to express how resources are used to some 
purpose. It is one way to express the potential in technology and in the social 
relations through which society is ordered, including the way technology is 
conceived and put to use. Given the broad sweep of the future Piketty wants us 
to consider, he is curiously myopic here and Pressman might have made more of 
this (not least because it is consistent with Piketty’s limited sense of how an 
economic issue is explored to achieve ‘explanation’).  
Piketty approaches the future as though metrics derived from the past are 
a reliable guide to that future. Tendencies are presented in numeric terms and 
defined by limits expressed in historical statistics (what growth rates have 
generally prevailed and what productivity levels have we observed). This is not 
nonsense, but it can be misleading. The past is a set of processes, and these 
include cumulative shifts that can be epochal (as in the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism). The past can thus give a sense of what the future might be like, 
without relying simply on quantitative trends and inferences: there can be 
breaks and transformations. The counterargument of course is that the historical 
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data are reliable and to ignore the persistence of historical regularities in 
demographic change and productivity growth is to commit the fallacy of ‘this 
time is different’. But one must also consider the problems and potentials being 
called forth within a historical conjuncture via the cumulative consequences of 
processes. This is a different way of articulating a point made by Mongiovi (2015, 
p. 563) regarding contemporary capitalism: ‘The great irony of Piketty’s book is 
that, even as he insists on the primacy of historical forces, he concludes that, in 
the end, those forces have had no permanent impact on the structure of 
capitalism.’ 
The two most prominent issues of our time are ecological disaster and 
digital technologies/machine learning. The prospect of the former raises 
questions regarding what kind of economic system will be viable in the future—
questions about degrowth, the need for radical social restructuring, and the 
adoption of new technologies that transform our very understanding of the 
relation between scarcity and resources (see Fontana and Sawyer 2016; Jackson 
and Victor 2016; Read 2015; Spash2012). The latter raises questions regarding 
the way an economy can function if many more skilled jobs become redundant, 
since, under current socioeconomic arrangements, an economy of consumers 
cannot exist without an economy of workers. Neither of these issues is localised 
to particular nations or sectors: they involve processes that are universally 
significant and they imply basic restructuring of economic life. If one takes the 
trends and data seriously then ecological relations and capital-wage relations 
cannot be the same in the future because of the things we have already done. 
This means that inequality cannot continue to be founded on the same sets of 
relations (though this does not mean inequality will inevitably disappear).  
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So, though a ‘this time is different’ argument may not always apply, a ‘this 
time must be different’ statement can be a reasonable inference from historical 
evidence. Posed this way, Piketty’s concerns would have a very different 
contextual point of departure for speculation regarding the future. This may 
seem peripheral to Piketty’s concerns, as he states them; but remember how he 
positions his book—as political economy using data purposefully to shape our 
understanding of and solutions to the fundamental problem of inequality. In 
many respects the whole is a positional argument that opposes the future it 
predicts. But it is also a lost opportunity for something more ambitious—a 
political economy of positional arguments for possible futures. Pressman’s 
Understanding Piketty’s Capital is an excellent first step toward this more 
ambitious project.      
 Jamie Morgan 
Leeds Beckett University 
Jamiea.morgan@hotmail.co.uk 
References 
    
Birdsall, N. 2014. ‘Thomas Piketty’s Capital and the developing world’, Ethics & 
International Affairs 28, no 4: 523-538 
Fontana, G. and Sawyer, M. 2016. ‘Towards post-Keynesian ecological 
macroeconomics.’ Ecological Economics 121: 186-195  
Fullbrook, E. and Morgan, J. editors. 2014. Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century London: College Books   
 16 
Giles, C. (2014) ‘Piketty findings undercut by data,’ Financial Times. May 23 
[http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e1f343ca-e281-11e3-89fd-00144feabdc0 
.html#axzz43ScxeWo8].  
Jackson, T. and Victor, P. 2016 ‘Does slow growth lead to rising inequality? Some 
theoretical reflections and numerical simulations.’ Ecological Economics 
121: 206-219   
Lawson, T. 2003. Reorienting Economics London: Routledge  
Mankiw, G. 2015. ‘Yes, r>g. So what?’ American Economic Review 105, no. 5: 43-
47 
Milanovic, B. 2014. ‘The return of ‘patrimonial capitalism’: A review of Thomas 
Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century.’ Journal of Economic 
Literature 52: 519-534 
Mongiovi, G. 2015. ‘Piketty on Capitalism and inequality: A radical economics 
perspective. ’ Review of Radical Political Economics 47: 458-465  
Morgan, J. 2015. ‘Piketty’s calibration economics: Inequality and the dissolution 
of solutions?’ Globalizations 12, no. 5: 803-823 
Palley, T. 2014. ‘The accidental controversialist: Deeper reflections on Thomas 
Piketty’s Capital.’ Real World Economics Review, 67: 143–146. 
Perrons, D. 2014. ‘Gendering inequality: a note on Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-
First Century.’ British Journal of Sociology 65: 667-677 
Read, R. 2015. ‘Green economics versus growth economics.’ Radical Philosophy 
189: 9-13 
Sawyer, M. 2015. ‘Confronting inequality: review article on Thomas Piketty on 
‘Capital in the 21st Century.’ International Review of Applied Economics 29: 
878-889  
 17 
Sheil, C. 2014. ‘Piketty’s political economy’, Journal of Australian Political 
Economy 74: 19-37   
Spash, C. 2012. ‘New foundations for ecological economics.’ Ecological Economics 
77: 36-47  
  
 
  
